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I 
INTRODUCTION 
A large body of scholarly literature seeks to explain why states voluntarily 
commit themselves to legal regimes designed to monitor implementation of 
international human rights standards.1 Dozens of human rights treaties have been 
promulgated over the past six decades and some have gained near-universal 
adherence. Yet the consequences of these international commitments for human 
rights practices are hotly contested. Some argue that international law has 
contributed very little to improving rights.2 Others claim that international 
human rights law has failed to help the people who need it the most.3  Many allege 
that United Nations (UN) enforcement has been an utter failure, and that UN 
treaty bodies constitute a bloated, toothless bureaucracy that is unable to 
contribute much to rights protections. 
It is time to bring evidence to bear on this debate about the value of UN 
oversight of international human rights law. Studies on the effects of treaty 
ratification are now plentiful. But none of these systematically examines one of 
the main consequences of human rights treaty ratification: the obligatory self-
reporting process.4 All major UN human rights treaties have established bodies 
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1. Oona A. Hathaway, The Cost of Commitment, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1821 (2003); BETH A. 
SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC POLITICS 
(Cambridge University Press 2009). 
2.  ERIC A POSNER, THE TWILIGHT OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (Oxford University Press 2014).
3.   EMILIE HAFNER-BURTON, MAKING HUMAN RIGHTS A REALITY (Princeton University Press 
2013). 
4. There are a small number of case studies on the influence of reporting to various treaty bodies,
but to date they have been few in number, limited in geographic scope, and generally inconclusive about 
the connection between reporting and rights outcomes. Ronagh McQuigg, How Effective is the United 
BOOK PROOF -  CREAMER SIMMONS - DYNAMIC IMPACT OF PERIODIC REVIEW (DO NOT DELETE) 11/26/2018  9:03 PM 
32 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 81:31 
of experts to oversee treaty implementation. States parties are obligated to self-
report to these bodies of putative experts. Critics uniformly point out that these 
bodies cannot enforce their recommendations. This is true. However, it does not 
necessarily follow that they are useless or without effect. 
Why would rights outcomes be influenced by self-reporting? Self-reporting 
creates at least three possible channels of influence that do not involve traditional 
notions of external enforcement.5 Critically, reporting to treaty monitoring 
bodies initiates a dialogue with international experts that can have important 
consequences. This dialogue can contribute to socialization of domestic elites and 
bureaucrats responsible for human rights practices. It may also set in motion 
domestic bureaucratic routines to gather, authenticate, and analyze information 
that might not have occurred in the absence of the obligation to report. It is even 
possible that reporting helps to develop an autonomous capacity to self-monitor 
and self-enforce.6 
While self-reporting may impact rights outcomes through these three 
pathways, this article focuses on how self-reporting and external review provides 
information for domestic audiences and an opportunity to mobilize around issues 
of concern.7 Thus, it may be useful to recast self-reporting not simply as a 
procedural obligation that supports traditional external enforcement, but as an 
opportunity for a variety of domestic audiences to hold their governments 
accountable to their international human rights commitments. 
This article uses the case of women’s rights to assess the value of self-
reporting and the discussion it stimulates. Each state party is obligated under the 
Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)8 to 
turn in periodic reports on the status of their implementation for review by the 
Committee for the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CmEDAW). 
Non-state actors are also active in this process; they turn in shadow reports that 
contain information on implementation to the CmEDAW. The Committee 
responds to the reports it receives, and provides guidance and recommendations 
on next steps. Governments are asked—indeed encouraged and obligated—to 
 
Nations Committee Against Torture?, 22 EUR. J. OF INT’L L. 813 (2011); MARILOU MCPHEDRAN ET AL., 
THE FIRST CEDAW IMPACT STUDY: FINAL REPORT (2000). 
 5.  As many have noted, enforcement mechanisms in the human rights context are likely be indirect, 
and work through non-governmental actors, transnational organizations, information mechanisms, and 
domestic institutions. Geoff Dancy & Kathryn Sikkink, Ratification and Human Rights Prosecutions: 
Toward a Transnational Theory of Treaty Compliance, 44 N.Y.U. J. OF INT’L L. & POL. 751 (2011-2012); 
Xinyuan Dai, The Conditional Effects of International Human Rights Institutions, 36 HUM. RTS. Q. 569 
(2014); Susanne Zwingel, How Do Norms Travel? Theorizing International Women’s Rights in 
Transnational Perspective, 56 INT’L STUD. Q. 115 (2012). 
 6.  Specialized agencies and INGOs often assist governments who may need technical or data help 
in reporting to the CEDAW, contributing to improved capacity to collect and report data. See, e.g., 
WOMEN’S HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS: MONITORING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF CEDAW 4 (World 
Health Organization ed., 2007). 
 7.  Xinyuan Dai, Why Comply? The Domestic Constituency Mechanism, 59 INT’L ORG. 363 (2005). 
 8.  Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 
1249 U.N.T.S. 13, http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3970.html [https://perma.cc/Q72M-MVYW (last 
visited Oct. 8, 2018) [hereinafter CEDAW]. 
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respond to these questions and recommendations. In this way treaty ratification 
initiates an iterative and ongoing “constructive dialogue” between a government 
and the international human rights regime about progress—or lack thereof—on 
treaty implementation. 
Plenty of states have ratified CEDAW, but they have quite heterogeneous 
laws and traditions in place,9 making women’s rights a fertile case for the 
influence of external review. Several studies conclude that ratification of 
CEDAW is, in fact, associated with improved outcomes for a range of women’s 
rights,10 although many are careful to note that positive effects are highly 
conditional.11 None of this research examines the effects of self-reporting. 
Women’s rights organizations clearly use the treaty to focus their demands for 
specific policies12 and to bolster legal cases.13 The CEDAW is therefore a case in 
which the domestic political reverberations of state-to-expert dialogue is 
plausible. 
This article shows that self-reporting has a significant positive effect on 
women’s rights. This paper explores three clusters of evidence for the domestic 
mobilization mechanism: information provision through domestic civil society 
organizations; publicity and critique through the domestic media; and 
parliamentary attention, debate, and implementation of recommendations. This 
is the first study to present positive evidence on the effects of self-reporting on 
rights and to describe the mechanisms that link Geneva treaty bodies with local 
politics. 
Part II summarizes the treaty-based periodic review process and the claims 
made about this system’s (un)importance. Drawing from an original dataset, this 
article then describes patterns in the frequency and quality of states’ reporting 
under CEDAW, and presents evidence that poor reporting is more connected to 
a lack of state capacity than to a disregard for women’s rights. Part III theorizes 
one primary channel through which reporting influences women’s rights 
practices: via domestic political awareness and mobilization. Part IV presents 
systematic evidence on the likely effect of reporting and engagement with the 
 
 9.   Judith Resnik, Comparative (In)equalities: CEDAW, the Jurisdiction of Gender, and the 
Heterogeneity of Transnational Law Production, 10 INT’L J. OF CONST. L. 531 (2012). 
 10.   Daniel W. Jr. Hill, Estimating the Effects of Human Rights Treaties on State Behavior, 72 THE 
J. OF POL. 1161 (2010); Yonatan Lupu, The Informative Power of Treaty Commitment: Using the Spatial 
Model to Address Selection Effects, 57 AM. J. OF POL. SCI. 912 (2013); Mark M. Gray et al., Women and 
Globalization: A Study of 180 Countries, 1975–2000, 60 INT’L ORG. 293 (2006). 
 11.  Seo-Young Cho, International Women’s Convention, Democracy, and Gender Equality, 95 SOC. 
SCI. Q. 719 (2014); Wade M. Cole, Human Rights as Myth and Ceremony? Reevaluating the Effectiveness 
of Human Rights Treaties, 1981–2007, 117 AM. J. OF SOC. 1131 (2012); SIMMONS, supra note 1; Kevin 
Cope & Cosette D. Creamer, Disaggregating the Human Rights Treaty Regime, 56 VA. J. OF INT’L L. 459 
(2017). 
 12.  S. Laurel Weldon & Mala Htun, Feminist Mobilisation and Progressive Policy Change: Why 
Governments Take Action to Combat Violence Against Women, 21 GENDER & DEV. 231 (2013). 
 13.  RECOGNIZING RIGHTS, PROMOTING PROGRESS: THE GLOBAL IMPACT OF THE CONVENTION 
OF [SIC] THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN (International 
Center for Research on Women ed., 2010). 
BOOK PROOF -  CREAMER SIMMONS - DYNAMIC IMPACT OF PERIODIC REVIEW (DO NOT DELETE) 11/26/2018  9:03 PM 
34 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 81:31 
CmEDAW on women’s rights, while Part V presents evidence supporting a 
domestic mobilization mechanism in Latin America. Part VI concludes. These 
results are the first to show systematically that self-reporting likely has positive 
consequences. They suggest that the international community should not think 
of self-reporting as a hard enforcement mechanism, but rather as an opportunity 
for domestic stakeholders to mold their own futures in the shadow of 
international law. 
II 
STATE REPORTING ON WOMEN’S RIGHTS 
A. Historical Context 
Public international law has long been recognized as a highly decentralized 
system that treads a delicate line between voluntary participation and 
enforceable obligations. The more stringent the demands made on states, it has 
long been feared, the less willing they will be to obligate themselves to a legal 
agreement. While self-reporting requirements have been fairly common in a 
range of modern treaties, they only developed gradually in the realm of 
international human rights law. Early efforts to encourage reporting on the 
implementation of international human rights norms were largely reflected in 
hortatory resolutions requesting information, emanating from the General 
Assembly and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) of the United 
Nations. As early as 1947, the General Assembly recommended that the 
Secretary-General request member states to report annually to ECOSOC, who 
would in turn report to the General Assembly on steps taken to give effect to 
“recommendations made by the General Assembly on matters falling within the 
Council’s competence.”14 This resolution was intended to include the principles 
contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which had 
no explicit provisions for implementation. Perhaps unsurprisingly, few states 
responded to such a general exhortation. ECOSOC thus postponed systematic 
review and instead perused the few reports it received on an ad hoc basis. Five 
years later, the submission of official state reports remained a rarity, and so the 
Council decided to discontinue the system of self-reporting entirely.15 
The first resolution calling for systematic state self-reporting on human rights 
was passed by the ECOSOC in 1956.16 This resolution requested UN members to 
transmit reports to the Secretary General every three years and described ways 
in which they were implementing principles of the UDHR. John Humphrey, then 
 
 14.  G.A. Res. 119 (II) (Oct. 31, 1947). 
 15.  Early efforts to set up a self-reporting system are discussed in John Humphrey, Report of the 
Rapporteur of the International Committee on Human Rights, in REPORT OF THE FIFTY-THIRD 
CONFERENCE [OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION] HELD AT BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINA, 
AUGUST 1968 at 439 (International Law Association ed., 1969) [hereinafter HUMPHREY]. 
 16.  Economic and Social Council Res. 624B (XXII) (Aug. 1, 1956), https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/NR0/766/28/IMG/NR076628.pdf?OpenElement [https://perma.cc/FV26-
BSJH]. 
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serving as Rapporteur of the International Committee on Human Rights, would 
later report that 41 states responded as requested in the first round of reporting, 
and sixty-seven responded in the second round, between 1957 and 1959. But Cold 
War rhetoric and a perfunctory review by the Human Rights Commission 
rendered the exercise ineffective.17 Self-reporting received a boost six years later, 
when non-governmental organizations with consultative status in the ECOSOC 
were invited to submit their views and observations to the Council. As the 
ECOSOC resolution put it, “to meet the objectives set by the Commission . . . 
and to promote respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, a greater number of reports are required and more information should 
be given therein concerning the problems or difficulties which have been or may 
be encountered . . . .”18 The system of shadow reporting—or the submission of 
alternative reports—by civil society organizations was thereby created. 
State and institutional cooperation remained elusive. In 1965, ECOSOC 
invited states to participate in a three-year cycle of reporting on specific rights 
areas, including civil and political rights, economic and social rights, and freedom 
of information.19 This process routed state reports through the Sub-Commission 
on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities, which 
generally failed to read them—an outcome John Humphrey referred to as “a 
political victory won by governments who do not favour the international 
enforcement of human rights.”20 And yet, rights advocates knew they were not in 
a position to do much more than request state information. Despite his 
frustrations, Humphreys concluded that “[o]f the various techniques, reporting is 
the one with which the international community has had the most and probably 
the most successful experience . . . . In a situation where, as today, governments 
seem to be unwilling to vest international supervisory bodies with adequate 
powers to deal with complaints, reporting may indeed, even for these rights, be 
the most practical means of implementation.”21 
Self-reporting as part of a consent-based treaty obligation was another 
possible route to enhance implementation. This approach would build on an 
explicit legal commitment and engage expert implementation committees rather 
than the politicized and government-composed bodies of the United Nations. 
However, the early treaties that dealt with women’s rights had practically no 
implementation provisions. The Convention on the Political Rights of Women 
 
 17.   HUMPHREY, supra note 15. 
 18.  Economic and Social Council Res. 888B (XXXIV) (July 24, 1962), https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/NR0/759/95/IMG/NR075995.pdf?OpenElement [https://perma.cc/5ZQQ-
PKRH]. 
 19.  Economic and Social Council Res. 1074C (XXXIX) (July 28, 1965), https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/NR0/760/97/IMG/NR076097.pdf?OpenElement [http://perma.cc/74DU-
ADNX]. 
 20.  HUMPHREY, supra note 15, at 442. 
 21.  HUMPHREY, supra note 15, at 438–39. 
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(1952),22 the Convention on the Nationality of Married Women (1957),23 and the 
Convention on Consent to Marriage (1962)24 all contain interstate dispute 
settlement through the International Court of Justice—provisions that have 
proved practically irrelevant when it comes to women’s rights—but no reporting 
requirements.25 In the fashion of the day, ECOSOC26 and the UNGA27 passed 
resolutions requesting and recommending state parties to report on 
implementation, and in 1963 extended this request to all UN members.28 But until 
the CEDAW, no treaty on women’s rights or issues contained an obligation for 
parties to self-report.29 
Why were women’s rights treaties behind the reporting requirement curve? 
For several reasons that have been the subject of much feminist analysis,30 
women’s rights had for many years not been seen as central to the main body of 
human rights. The CEDAW was a turning point in this regard. Two important 
moments in history supported global attention to women’s rights. First and most 
importantly, the women’s movement was at its height between 1965 and 1985, 
which gave impetus to the elaboration of women’s rights in international law.31 
 
 22.  G.A. Res. 640 (VII) Convention on the Political Rights of Women (Dec. 20, 1952). 
 23.  G.A. Res. 1040 (XI) Convention on the Nationality of Married Women (Jan. 29, 1957). 
 24.  G.A. Res. 1763 A (XVII) Convention on Consent to Marriage (Nov. 7, 1962). 
 25.   States parties are required under the Convention of the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons 
and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others (1950—not quite a human rights treaty, but 
considered at the time to deal with women’s issues) to communicate to the Secretary General of the UN 
the passage of laws relevant to the treaty. G.A. Res. 317 (IV), art. 21 (Dec. 2, 1949). 
 26.  Economic and Social Council Res. 504 E (XVI) (July 23, 1953). 
 27.  G.A. Res. 793 (VII), at 50 (Oct. 23, 1953). 
 28.  Economic and Social Council Res. 961 B (XXXVI) (July 12, 1963); G.A. Res. 2018 (XX) 
Recommendation on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage, and Registration of Marriages 
(Nov. 1, 1965). 
 29.  Note however that several ILO labor conventions that aim to protect female workers from 
discrimination do have a reporting requirement. The conventions include the Int’l Labor Organization 
[ILO], Convention 1958 (No. 111) Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention (June 15, 
1960); ILO, Convention 1951 (No.100) Equal Remuneration Convention (May 23, 1953); ILO, 
Convention 1981 (No. 156) Workers with Family Responsibilities Convention (Aug. 11, 1983); ILO, 
Convention 2000 (No. 183) Maternity Protection Convention ( June 15, 2000). The ILO constitution does 
mandate annual reports, to be examined by both a committee of experts and the International Labor 
Conference itself; ILO Constitution art. 22. 
 30.  See, e.g., Hilary Charlesworth et al., Feminist Approaches to International Law, 85 AM. J. OF 
INT’L L. 613 (1991). 
 31.  Jane Jenson, Representation of Difference: The Varieties of French Feminism, in MAPPING THE 
WOMEN’S MOVEMENT: FEMINIST POLITICS AND SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION IN THE NORTH (Mónica 
Threlfall ed., 1996); LEILA J. RUPP, WORLDS OF WOMEN: THE MAKING OF AN INTERNATIONAL 
WOMEN’S MOVEMENT (Princeton University Press 1997); VALENTINE M. MOGHADAM, GLOBALIZING 
WOMEN: TRANSNATIONAL FEMINIST NETWORKS (Johns Hopkins University Press 2005). Women’s 
groups such as the Women’s International Democratic Federation urged ECOSOC that “Adoption of 
the single convention would place the States under the obligation to review existing legislation regarding 
women and indicate the shortcomings that exist in national legislation relative to the equality of women 
with men. It would thus enable the broad mobilization of public opinion around these problems.” 
Economic and Social Council, “Statement submitted by the Women’s International Democratic 
Federation, a non-governmental organization in consultative status with the Economic and Social 
Council.” E/CN.6/NGO/254. Jan. 11, 1974. 
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Secondly, détente was starting to overtake the Cold War freeze on the 
negotiation of new human rights treaties, and a reasonable degree of agreement 
existed between East and West on women’s rights.32 In early 1967, the United 
Nation’s’ Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) began drafting a non-
binding Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women 
(DEDAW), which was adopted by the General Assembly in November of that 
year.33 The ECOSOC and CSW worked on strategies for implementing the 
declaration over the next several years. In the hortatory tradition described 
above, one tactic was to ask states to submit reports on their implementation 
efforts voluntarily, but this request elicited very little cooperation.34 By the mid-
1970s the CSW was drafting of a comprehensive and legally binding instrument, 
and by 1976 began to garner the comments of governments and specialized 
agencies. 1975 was declared the International Year of the Woman and opened 
the Decade of the Woman from 1976 to 1985, which helped to focus global 
attention on women’s issues. Thus, the CEDAW stood as the culmination of a 
series of multilateral negotiations on women’s issues after World War II. 
Self-reporting requirements were very much a part of the discussions of the 
Working Group that drafted the CEDAW.35 An early Soviet draft did not contain 
a reporting requirement, directing only that the ECOSOC consider periodically 
whether the convention was being implemented.36  The Netherlands called for 
civil society participation in the reporting process “granting these organizations 
the function of correspondent. As correspondents they might play a role in 
channelling [sic] wishes and complaints towards an international forum,” such as 
the CSW.37  Canada suggested all reporting go through the CSW, in order to avoid 
 
 32.  LARS ADAM REHOF, GUIDE TO THE TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES OF THE UNITED NATIONS 
CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN (Kluwer 
Acad. Publishers 1993). 
 33.  Proclaimed by G.A. Res. 2263 (XXII) (Nov. 7, 1967). 
 34.  REHOF, supra note 32, at 7. 
 35.  Finland called for a reporting system resembling that of the ILO. Economic and Social Council, 
Rep. of the Comm’n on the Status of Women on Its Twenty-Fifth Session, International Instruments and 
National Standards Relating to the Status of Women: Consideration of Proposals Concerning a new 
Instrument or Instruments of International Law to Eliminate Discrimination Against Women, U.N. DOC. 
E/CN.6/573 (Nov. 6, 1973), para. 103 [hereinafter Comm’n on the Status of Women on Its Twenty-Fifth 
Session]. Sweden endorsed the model contained in the CERD (Ibid., p. 107), as did the Commission on 
the Status of Women. Economic and Social Council Res., Rep. of the Comm’n on the Status of Women 
on Its Twenty-Fourth Session, International Instruments and National Standards Relating to the Status of 
Women: Study of Provisions in existing conventions that relate to the status of women, U.N Doc. 
E/CN.6/552 (Jan. 21, 1972), para. 232. The Philippines advocated using existing machinery, such as the 
Human Rights Committee, so as to not duplicate reporting requirements. Comm’n on the Status of 
Women on Its Twenty-Fifth Session, supra, para. 106. 
 36.  Working Group on a New Instrument or Instruments of International Law to Eliminate 
Discrimination against Women, Working paper submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 
submitted to the Economic and Social Council Res., U.N. DOC. E/CN.6/AC.1/L.2 (Jan. 7, 1974). Draft 
Article 22: “Every four years following this Convention’s entry into force, the Economic and Social 
Council of the United Nations shall consider the question of the status of the implementation of the 
Convention in order to satisfy itself that the purpose stated in the preamble and articles of the Convention 
are being carried out.” 
 37.  Comm’n on the Status of Women on Its Twenty-Fifth Session, supra note 35, ¶ 105. 
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“conflict in implementation procedures” across treaties.38 Several countries 
anticipated today’s critique of reporting overlap, and called for simplifications.39 
Women’s groups were strongly behind reporting; in fact the draft article on state 
reporting was the only provision mentioned explicitly in a crucial 1976 statement 
by a broad coalition of women’s NGOs sent to the Working Group.40  In the end, 
a proposal by Egypt, Nigeria, and Zaire to use language almost identical to that 
contained in the CERD was accepted.41 A series of working groups finalized the 
agreement throughout 1979, and the CEDAW, with Article 18 describing the 
obligation to report on implementation, opened for signature the next year. 
B. Self-Reporting and the CEDAW 
As this history suggests, the major international human rights treaties were 
meant to improve rights through enhanced accountability. CEDAW was the first 
women’s rights instrument to make self-reporting obligatory for states parties. 
By virtue of ratifying CEDAW, states must submit reports every four years on 
the legislative, judicial, administrative, or other measures adopted to give effect 
to their women’s rights obligations.42 Similar to self-reporting under the 
Covenants and the CERD, these reports are submitted to an oversight 
committee—the CmEDAW—comprised of independent experts nominated and 
elected by states parties. CmEDAW then considers these reports in the presence 
of government representatives, acknowledges progress made, and identifies 
areas for improvement. Finally, oversight committees issue a set of concluding 
observations containing non-binding recommendations for legislative reforms 
and other efforts that a government should undertake to address shortcomings.43 
This entire process is known as periodic review. All state reports, reports received 
from other intergovernmental and civil society organizations, and CmEDAW 
recommendations are made public. 
In contrast to early resolutions exhorting states to voluntarily report to 
ECOSOC or the UNGA, periodic review was intended to encourage treaty 
implementation and compliance, with the “main responsibility for the 
international monitoring of national implementation . . . entrusted to the UN 
 
 38.  Comm’n on the Status of Women on Its Twenty-Fifth Session, supra note 35, ¶ 104. 
 39.  For Austria, Brazil, and Canada, see Comm’n on the Status of Women on Its Twenty-Fifth 
Session, supra note 35, Austria, ¶¶ 108–110. 
 40.  Economic and Social Council, Rep. of the Comm’n on the Status of Women on Its Twenty-Sixth 
Session, International Instruments Relating to the Status of Women, Draft Convention on the Elimination 
of Discrimination Against Women, U.N. DOC. E/CN.6/NGO/259 (Aug. 26, 1976), ¶ 4. 
 41.  Economic and Social Council, Rep. of the Working Group on a New Instrument or Instruments 
of International Law to Eliminate Discrimination against Women, Nigeria and Zaire: Draft Proposals 
Concerning the Measures of Implementation of the Draft Convention, U.N. DOC. E/CN.6/AC.1/L.5 (Jan. 
9, 1974). With the slight exception of explicitly not requiring the submission of information that had been 
provided to other specialized agencies of the UN. Article 2.1(a and b). 
 42.  CEDAW, supra note 8, Part V, art. 18, 18 Dec. 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 14. 
 43.  Michael O’Flaherty, The Concluding Observations of United Nations Human Rights Treaty 
Bodies, 6 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 36 (2006). 
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human rights treaty bodies.”44 Because reporting is a mandatory obligation, the 
report and review process is “the key mechanism established at the universal 
level to monitor the implementation of treaty obligations by contracting states.”45 
In the case of CEDAW, implementation oversight was initially weaker than that 
of other major human rights treaties. For example, the CmEDAW did not move 
to Geneva and receive the administrative support of the office of the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights like the other human rights treaty bodies until 
2008. Several analysts have concluded that initially at least, CEDAW’s system of 
implementation oversight was probably weaker than that of the two core 
Covenants.46 
The system of self-reporting as a whole continues to be criticized as 
inadequate, ineffective, and even “in crisis.”47 Some observers point to the 
professional inadequacies of the expert committees.48  Others note that states—
even resource rich, democratic ones—ignore what they are told to do by 
experts.49 Moreover, there is a growing sense among critics that the system as a 
whole is breaking under its own unwieldy weight.50 As the number of treaties has 
grown, so too have the treaty bodies to which states are expected to report. One 
result may be reporting fatigue.51 Late and non-reporting is not uncommon, 
although CEDAW holds a slightly better record than a number of other treaty 
regimes, which is surprising in light of the weaker initial administrative support 
for the CmEDAW. 
Of the 188 states party to the CEDAW in 2016, only five countries had still 
not submitted their initial report.52 Between 1982—when the first report was 
due—and 2016, the average length of delay in report submission was 3.7 years.53  
The Committee recently has begun to encourage submission of long overdue 
 
 44.  HELEN KELLER & GEIR ULFSTEIN, UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY BODIES: LAW AND 
LEGITIMACY  2 (2012). 
 45.  Walter Kälin, Examination of State Reports, in UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY BODIES: LAW 
AND LEGITIMACY, supra note 44, at 16. 
 46.  Neil A. Englehart & Melissa K. Miller, The CEDAW Effect: International Law’s Impact on 
Women’s Rights, 13 J. OF HUM. RTS. 24 (2014); Susanne Zwingel, From Intergovernmental Negotiations 
to (Sub)national Change, 7 INT’L FEMINIST J. OF POL. 405 (2005). 
 47.  PHILIP ALSTON & JAMES CRAWFORD, THE FUTURE OF UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY 
MONITORING: A SYSTEM IN CRISIS? (2000); ANNE F. BAYEFSKY, THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY 
SYSTEM: UNIVERSALITY AT THE CROSSROADS (2001). 
 48.  HAFNER-BURTON, supra note 3, at 102. 
 49.  McQuigg, supra note 4.  
 50.  POSNER, supra note 2; HAFNER-BURTON, supra note 3, at 99. 
 51.  Françoise J Hampson, An Overview of the Reform of the UN Human Rights Machinery, 7 HUM. 
RTS. L. REV. 7 (2007); Hanna Beate Schöpp-Schilling, Treaty Body Reform: the Case of the Committee 
on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 7 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 201 (2007). 
 52.  Dominica, Kiribati, Micronesia, San Marino, and São Tomé and Príncipe. 
 53.  The length of time reports are overdue includes those instances where the Committee has 
indicated in its concluding observations on the prior report that a revised date of submission (usually in 
the near future) is permitted. In addition to extending due dates and consolidating reports, the 
Committee often reviews within one session two separate reports submitted by a government. These 
represent methods through which the Committee has attempted to address both systematic late reporting 
and its own increased workload, deviating from the periodicity mandated in the Convention. 
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reports by reviewing implementation progress even in the absence of a state 
report. For instance, although Dominica never submitted its initial report due in 
1982, the Committee issued concluding observations in 2009 based on an in-
person dialogue with Dominican government representatives.54 In this way, states 
are encouraged to participate in a dialogue with the CmEDAW even if they fail 
to report. 
Figure 1 illustrates the record of state reporting to the CmEDAW since the 
treaty entered into force. Between 1982—when the Committee received its first 
reports—and 2014, governments have submitted a total of 621 implementation 
reports. Report submission has increased steadily over the years in tandem with 
growing treaty membership. Of these, 229 reports were considered consolidated 
or combined reports due to delayed submission; in such cases, one report counts 
for two (up to four) reports due. Many states have submitted six to eight reports. 
However, many states seem unable to meet their obligation to go beyond an 
initial or second report. 
The ultimate goal is to understand the consequences of state reporting, but it 
is critical to understand why states report—or fail to—in the first place. What 
factors increase the probability a state will turn in a report to the CmEDAW in 
any given year? 
 
 54.  The Committee first notifies the states party that in the absence of a report, it will proceed with 
a consideration of the implementation of the Convention on a set date. 
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Figure 1: Report Submission by Year.55 
 
Figure 2 presents the expected probability of reporting as each explanatory 
variable changes, based on a pooled logistic odds regression.56 The figure shows 
how (holding other traits constant) different state characteristics are associated 
with a higher probability that a state reports in a given year. The evidence for the 
importance of capacity is strong. The richer and larger a polity, the more likely it 
is to report in a given year. GDP per capita and total population (both logged) 
are strongly and positively correlated with reporting. Small, resource strapped 
states likely lack the capacity to meet their periodic treaty obligations to report.57 
There is also some evidence that reporting is, at least initially, correlated with 
strong buy-in to the human rights treaty system in general. The higher percentage 
of major human rights treaties a state has ratified, the more likely it is to turn in 
its CEDAW reports, though this relationship is substantively not large. As Figure 
2 demonstrates, a hypothetical doubling of the percentage of human rights 
 
 55. Disaggregated by Report Number (whether the report was the first submitted by a state party, 
the second, etc.). 
 56.  Logistic regression is a type of regression involving a limited (categorical) dependent or dummy 
variable. Pooling involves combining observations by state and by year in order to analyze average effects 
over a period of time. 
 57.  There is a similarity between this and a finding in the literature that smaller firms are most likely 
non-compliers with self-reporting to regulatory agencies. See, e.g., John Brehm & James T. Hamilton 
Noncompliance in Environmental Reporting: Are Violators Ignorant, or Evasive, of the Law?, 40 AM. J. 
OF POL. SCI. 444 (1996). 
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treaties ratified by a government (from 26 to 52%) only increases its probability 
of report submission by 2.5%. That being said, ratification of the CEDAW 
Optional Protocol (OP), which establishes the individual communication’s 
procedure for the treaty, is not strongly correlated with a higher likelihood of 
reporting. Granted, the OP did not enter into force until 2000. 
Figure 2: Likelihood of Reporting to CmEDAW.58 
 In contrast to the Convention against Torture (CAT), under which the 
existence of a National Human Rights Institution (NHRI) strongly correlates 
with greater likelihood of reporting,59 countries with an NHRI are neither more 
nor less likely to report to CmEDAW. Perhaps this type of human and 
institutional resource is not as central to the women’s rights context; what matters 
 
 58. Simulated estimates of probability of report submission. Circles represent the expected effect on 
the probability of report submission in a given year as GDP per capita, Total Population, Polity IV Scores 
(level of democracy), Women’s Political Empowerment Index (V-Dem), and Human Rights Treaties 
Ratified (percentage of all major human rights treaties) in the previous year changes from its 25th to 75th 
quartile, and all other variables are held constant at their means. For Muslim Law, Catholic, Ratification 
of the Optional Protocol, and National Human Rights Institution (NHRI), the circle represents the 
expected probability of reporting as these variables change from 0 to 1, and all other variables are held 
constant at their means. The lines are 95% confidence intervals. When the circles and lines are solid, 
there is at least a 95% confidence of a positive or negative effect on the probability of reporting. 
Otherwise, circles and lines are dotted. For traditional results of the pooled logistics odds regression see 
Supplementary Materials, infra note 62, at 3.  
 59.  Cosette Creamer & Beth A Simmons, Ratification, Reporting and Rights: Quality of 
Participation in the Convention Against Torture, 37 HUM. RTS. Q. 579 (2015). 
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instead may be the existence of a National Mechanism on Gender Equality 
(NMGE).60 Interestingly, democracies or countries that provide greater rights 
protections are not any more or less likely to report to CmEDAW. And states 
with legal systems entailing some elements of Islamic law are generally as—if not 
more—likely than other states to report.61 
Critics of the periodic review process are right about a number of its 
limitations. States often neglect to turn in their reports on time—if at all. 
Moreover, many reports celebrate the positive steps taken to improve women’s 
rights and fail to mention any shortcomings. However, many do explicitly 
recognize implementation shortcomings, particularly when such shortcomings 
can be attributed to lack of resources. 
To evaluate report quality and responsiveness under CEDAW, we read all 
621 reports submitted to the CmEDAW from 1982 to 2014 and coded each along 
four dimensions: three related to report quality (implementation, compliance, 
and data), and one concerning responsiveness. A report’s quality score, an index 
of the three quality measures, is based on the state’s willingness to recognize 
shortcomings in implementation or compliance, and to provide gender-
disaggregated data. A report’s responsiveness score is based on how well it 
engages with the Committee’s previous concluding observations.62 
To be sure, a report’s quality or responsiveness score does not measure the 
accuracy of the information provided, rather it measures the extent to which it 
explicitly addresses shortcomings in implementation of and compliance with the 
treaty’s terms. A higher quality score represents more self-critical reports. 
Examining report quality permits evaluation of the quality of states’ engagement 
with the periodic review process, not just as a procedural obligation, but as an 
opportunity for government officials and their constituents to learn about and 
become socialized into the women’s rights regime. 
Figure 3 displays the average quality and responsiveness scores of reports 
submitted, by year. While the quality of reports submitted to CmEDAW has 
improved over the years,63 there has not been that much improvement since the 
 
 60.  NMGEs include those bodies and institutions within different branches of the State (legislative, 
executive and judicial branches) as well as independent, accountability and advisory bodies that, 
together, are recognized as ‘national mechanisms for gender equality’ by all stakeholders. This could be 
in the form of a Ministry on Women or Gender Equality, a gender equality ombudsperson, a 
parliamentary committee, an inter-ministerial body, or multi-stakeholder advisory body. See U.N. 
WOMEN, Directory of National Mechanisms for Gender Equality (Sept. 2010), 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/documents/NatMech-Sept-2010-Web.pdf [https://perma.cc/F6YU-
F7SY]. 
 61.  Perhaps understandably, more Catholic societies are less likely—though not significantly—to 
report. Yet a bit surprisingly, neither the proportion of women in parliament nor the proportion of states 
reporting in the region (regional reporting density) increases a state’s reporting likelihood (results not 
reported). 
 62.  For the coding scheme and description of the coding process see Cosette D. Creamer & Beth A. 
Simmons, Supplementary Materials to The Dynamic Impact of Periodic Review on Women’s Rights 14–
17 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors) [hereinafter Supplementary Materials]. 
 63.  This observation is at least partially consistent with Kathryn Sikkink’s observation on the 
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mid to late 1990s. What has improved dramatically, however, is responsiveness 
to CmEDAW’s concluding observations (for second or later reports), suggesting 
increased engagement with the periodic review process and Committee 
recommendations. The CmEDAW has increasingly provided more detailed and 
concrete recommendations, which appears to have facilitated this greater 
responsiveness. 
Figure 3: Average CEDAW Report Quality and Responsiveness, by Year.64 
III 
THEORY: SELF-REPORTING AND REVIEW IN DOMESTIC POLITICS 
Does the reporting process facilitate improved women’s rights practices and 
increased treaty compliance? Hafner-Burton represents the informal consensus 
among commentators when she writes that “the reports often don’t seem to lead 
to results that matter.”65 Even members of the CmEDAW have surprisingly little 
to tell us about the impact of the Committee on actual state practices.66 
Thus, the central question is whether reporting matters to treaty 
implementation and respect for women’s rights. This study proposes that it does, 
primarily because of the dynamics underlying the reporting process itself. Many 
 
availability of information about human rights violations increasing over time. KATHRYN SIKKINK, 
EVIDENCE FOR HOPE: MAKING HUMAN RIGHTS WORK IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2017). 
 64.  See Appendix B on authors’ websites for coding guidelines. 
 65.  HAFNER-BURTON, supra note 3, at 100. 
 66.  H.B. SCHÖPP-SCHILLING & C. FLINTERMAN, THE CIRCLE OF EMPOWERMENT: TWENTY-FIVE 
YEARS OF THE UN COMMITTEE ON THE ELIMINATION OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN (2007). 
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theories of compliance with international law rely implicitly on the availability of 
information about government activities and legal obligations, particularly to 
domestic publics. For example, the knowledge that one’s government is publicly 
committed to comply with a human rights treaty may raise domestic groups’ 
expectations that they can demand compliance with such treaties. Xinyuan Dai 
argues that information produced by international bodies informs domestic 
audiences about the activities of their governments and whether a government 
has complied with its international legal obligations.67 This information allows 
domestic constituencies to apply electoral pressure on their government in order 
to hold them accountable. 
The very event of reporting serves to stimulate attention, discussion, and 
perhaps even participation in the process of report drafting. By mobilizing and 
empowering groups inside and outside of government, reporting can have a 
catalytic effect in promoting internal policy reform. The Committee’s concluding 
recommendations provide domestic constituencies with information needed to 
apply electoral and other forms of political pressure to encourage substantive 
compliance. Such information facilitates evaluation of a state’s treaty 
compliance, which helps domestic audiences to focus pressure on the government 
to perform better.68  Even when states are less than forthright, their reports 
provide a focal point for non-state actors to assess and criticize the information 
provided. As Jacqui True has written of the international reporting process, 
“[O]rganizing of women’s groups for the purpose of international reporting and 
global conferencing has consequently, often unintentionally, increased the 
effectiveness of women’s lobbying of local and national governments.”69  
 
     67.    Dai, supra note 7. 
 68.  A growing number of experimental studies provide micro-level data to supplement the largely 
observational literature connecting international obligations with enhanced compliance expectations. 
Adam S. Chilton, The Influence of International Human Rights Agreements on Public Opinion: An 
Experimental Study, 15 CHI. J. OF INT’L L. 112 (2014). Chilton finds some evidence that attitudes in the 
general population shift against domestic solitary confinement practices when informed that they may 
violate international legal obligations. Attitudes about the appropriateness of torture specifically have 
been shown to be influenced by international legal obligations, particularly when it is believed that third 
parties may enforce obligations. Geoffrey P.R. Wallace, International Law and Public Attitudes Toward 
Torture: An Experimental Study, 67 INT’L ORG. 105 (2013). These observations—that international legal 
obligations raise expectations of compliance, that reporting provides new information about the progress 
of compliance, and that authoritative third parties enhance these effects—all suggest that self-reporting 
to treaty bodies may be important for mobilizing publics and improving human rights practices on the 
ground. 
 69.  Jacqui True, Mainstreaming Gender in Global Public Policy, 5 INT’L FEMINIST J. OF POL. 377 
(2003). 
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Examples abound, from Southeast Asia70 to South Asia71 to Nigeria.72 A formal 
report submission presents opposition parties or NGOs and other rights 
constituencies with a convenient and visible occasion for mobilization. Indeed, 
political activism may contribute to the quality of governmental reporting over 
time by helping to expose its shortcomings. If so, then even incomplete or 
inadequately analyzed official information is much better than none at all. 
First, if the reporting cycle (the process over time of both submitting reports 
and receiving CmEDAW feedback and recommendations) can mobilize 
demands for better rights practices, we would expect to observe a positive 
relationship between a state’s participation in this process and improvements in 
its women’s rights practices. We do not expect this effect to be homogeneous 
across all states, but we do expect to see such a relationship if we have 
appropriately weighted for the effects of regime type on outcomes. Part IV 
evaluates this expectation. 
Second, there should be some evidence consistent with the mobilization 
argument, especially under conditions for which the theory is clearest: a region 
of the world that has experienced democratic transitions during which 
governments must engage in balancing the tradeoff between expectations and 
information consequences involved in the reporting decision. Part V follows up 
with evidence on the mechanism of mobilization in Latin America—a region that 
fulfills these conditions—in the form of civil society shadow reporting, media 
reporting, and domestic legislative activity. 
IV 
EVIDENCE: REPORTING, REVIEW, AND WOMEN’S RIGHTS 
This part examines how the process of periodic review and the history of a 
government’s engagement with the CEDAW regime impact subsequent rights 
practices. Because the act of treaty ratification itself generates the expectation of 
report submission, this study focuses only on states parties to the CEDAW using 
panel data on CEDAW report submission and Committee review for 184 states 
parties between 1982 and 2014. By the beginning of 2014, only seven of these 
states parties had not completed even one reporting-and-review cycle, 101 had 
completed between two and four cycles, and forty-six had completed five or more 
cycles. 
Figure 4 plots trends in average Women’s Political Empowerment scores by 
 
 70.  In Cambodia, for example, NGO-CEDAW’s role is to monitor and promote the implementation 
of CEDAW and to engage in advocacy following the publication of each NGO Shadow Report. See THE 
CAMBODIAN NGO COMMITTEE ON CEDAW, htttp://ngocedaw.org [https://perma.cc/4TDE-CJE7] (last 
visited Nov. 4, 2018). 
 71.  In South Asia, an organization explicitly focuses on building NGO capacity to report to 
CmEDAW. See CEDAW SOUTH ASIA, http://cedawsouthasia.org [https://perma.cc/PV6T-XSNR] (last 
visited Nov. 4, 2018). 
 72.  See, e.g., Int’l Fed’n for Human Rights, The Nigeria NGO Coalition Shadow Report to the 
CEDAW Committee (July 31, 2008), http://www.refworld.org/docid/48a0007a2.html 
[https://perma.cc/3N8V-SMFS]. 
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reporting record.73 These trends demonstrate that countries with greater initial 
levels of women’s empowerment have gone through more periodic review cycles 
since CEDAW entered into force. That said, countries that engage relatively 
regularly in periodic review (specifically more than two report-and-review cycles) 
have experienced greater improvements over time in women’s empowerment 
than those who have never submitted a report (or did so only once). 
 
Figure 4: Trends in Women’s Political Empowerment (V-Dem) by Reporting 
Group.74 
 
How can we isolate the causal effects of the report and review process on 
women’s rights? Self-reporting and periodic review is an ongoing and iterative 
process with potentially cumulative effects. It was never intended or designed to 
affect rights practices through a single report submission. Modeling the effects of 
a single-shot report is thus not the best approach to analyzing the dynamic nature 
 
 73.  See Michael Coppedge et al., V-Dem Codebook v7.1: Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project 
(2017), https://www.v-dem.net/en/reference/version-7-1-july-2017/ [https://perma.cc/P4UP-6WWD]. For 
similar trend figures using CIRI Women’s Political and Economic Rights, see Supplementary Materials, 
supra note 62, at 4. 
 74. Figure plots the average Women’s Political Empowerment score for (1) countries that had 
ratified CEDAW but not submitted any reports or had submitted only one report by 2014; (2) countries 
that had submitted 2–4 reports by 2014; (3) countries that had submitted 5+ reports by 2014. The index 
ranges from 0 to 1 and incorporates equally-weighted dimensions of fundamental civil liberties, women’s 
open discussion of political issues and participation in civil society organizations, and the descriptive 
representation of women in formal political positions. 
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of periodic review to the CmEDAW, since both the act of reporting and the 
evolving nature of the review process represent treatment variables of interest. 
Estimating the cumulative influence of the reporting and review process as a 
whole requires a different approach from conventional regression estimators for 
single-shot effects.  
To attempt to adjust for the dynamic nature of periodic review, we fit a 
Marginal Structural Model (MSM).75 This approach entails two steps. First, we 
estimated a model for treatment—here, CmEDAW review—in each time period, 
conditional on time-varying confounders and past reporting history.76 Then, we 
fit a regression model for the outcome, given treatment and treatment history, by 
weighting each observation with the inverse of its treatment probabilities 
calculated in the first step.77 The parameters of this weighted regression model 
bring us closer than ordinary regression to causal analysis, assuming important 
causal variables were not omitted, though it does not completely overcome issues 
that arise due to selection into the self-reporting process based on unobservable 
factors. Given the paucity of viable solutions to that problem, however, this 
approach is a substantial improvement over traditional methods. 
The weighting models estimating the probability of treatment (CmEDAW 
review at time t) include all potential confounders: covariates expected to 
influence both the decision to undergo periodic review and women’s rights 
practices. As discussed within Part II, capacity (measured with logged GDP per 
capita and population, as collected by the World Bank) and engagement with the 
international human rights regime (proxied by the percentage of major human 
rights treaties ratified) strongly predict report submission. These variables likely 
affect women’s rights outcomes as well, so this study includes them and a number 
of additional time-varying covariates in the weighting model: the degree of 
women’s political empowerment in each country;78 a country’s level of 
democracy;79 the existence of an NHRI; and ratification of CEDAW’s Optional 
Protocol. 
 
 75.  This approach was developed by Robins et al., Marginal Structural Models and Causal Inference 
in Epidemiology, 11 Epidemiology 550 (2000). And it was recently introduced to political science by 
Matthew Blackwell, A Framework for Dynamic Causal Inference in Political Science, 57 AM. J. OF POL. 
SCI. 1 (2013). These models are estimated using an Inverse Probability of Treatment Weighting (IPTW) 
estimator, which permits adjustment for intermediate confounders while avoiding bias from conditioning 
on a post-treatment variable. 
 76.  Because the decision to engage in the report-and-review process is binary, the probability of 
undergoing review was estimated with a logit model and the parameter vector for the model with a pooled 
logistic regression, with country-year as the unit of analysis. This permits us first to estimate the 
probability, in each period, that the unit received the treatment history that it did. 
 77.  Robins et al.  show that this weighting scheme adjusts for confounding by observed and time-
varying confounders. Supra note 75. Intuitively, weighting creates a hypothetical ‘super-population’ 
where the link between treatment and observable confounders is broken. 
 78. A measure of women’s empowerment is derived from an expert survey assessing the extent to 
which women can participate in formal political decision-making, and the extent to which women have 
opportunities to move freely and express their views (Varieties of Democracy Project). 
 79.  Democracy captures the extent of participation in and competitiveness of states’ political 
systems over time (Polity IV Score). 
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Two non-time-varying covariates are also included in the model: Islamic law 
and predominantly Catholic countries. Governments with elements of Islamic 
law within their legal systems are slightly more likely to submit their CEDAW 
reports, but present special challenges for CEDAW adherence.80 Similarly, 
predominantly Catholic countries are slightly less likely to submit their reports, 
and the strong role of the Catholic religion within society may make governments 
more reticent in fully implementing CEDAW guarantees, particularly in the 
realm of reproductive and family rights.81 
In addition to these confounders, a set of treatment history variables is 
included within the weighting models; in this case a state’s history of CmEDAW 
periodic review. This permits us to estimate the average treatment effect of both 
the single-shot treatment of undergoing review and the history of a country’s 
engagement with the review process on a government’s women’s rights practices. 
These treatment history variables include: the total number of in-person 
CmEDAW reviews undertaken by a country by time t; whether the country had 
undergone review in the previous year; and the number of years since the last 
review.82 All weighting models include year fixed effects.83 
In a second step, we fit an inverse-probability weighted MSM to estimate the 
effects of CmEDAW review (the treatment) and the review process (treatment 
history variables) on women’s human rights practices at year t+2. Because we 
have few priors about precisely when we should expect the review process to 
affect women’s rights practices on the ground, we estimate its effects two years 
following review, as significant reforms of deficient legislation and practices often 
cannot occur instantaneously. Indeed, one of the primary conclusions of case 
studies on the effectiveness of the CmEDAW is that implementing Committee 
recommendations often takes several years.84 
There are potentially dozens of ways to measure women’s rights. One 
possibility is to test indicators that relate to specific articles of the CEDAW, such 
as a measure of women’s or girls’ education, health, or employment outcomes.85  
Instead, this study tests broad measures of women’s political empowerment and 
fundamental civil rights (as developed by the Varieties of Democracy project), 
largely because the periodic review dialogues are broad-ranging and cover issues 
 
 80.   Anita M. Weiss, Interpreting Islam and Women’s Rights: Implementing CEDAW in Pakistan, 18 
INT’L SOC. 581 (2003). 
 81.   SIMMONS, supra note 1, at 221, 245–53. 
 82.  Following Blackwell, supra note 75, and Stephen R. Cole & Miguel A. Hernán, Constructing 
Inverse Probability Weights for Marginal Structural Models, 15 AM. J. OF EPIDEMIOLOGY 565 (2008), a 
preliminary model check was conducted based on the final distributions of the stabilized weights for each 
year. The stabilized weights’ means at each point in time are all close to one, with their upper bounds 
relatively low, indicating a set of fairly well-behaved weights was estimated. See Supplementary 
Materials, supra note 62, at 6. 
 83.  For weighting model estimates see Supplementary Materials, supra note 62, at 5. 
 84.  Andrew Byrnes & Marsha A. Freeman, The Impact of the CEDAW Convention: Paths to 
Equality, A Study for the World Bank, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT: GENDER EQUALITY AND 
DEVELOPMENT (2012). 
 85.  SIMMONS, supra note 1. 
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that differ by country and even by report.86  
 
Figure 5: Estimated CmEDAW review treatment and treatment history 
effects.87  
 
Figure 5 plots the estimated instantaneous and history effects of the review 
process along with bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals.88 The single, 
instantaneous effect of review at time t on women’s political empowerment at 
time t+2 is statistically indistinguishable from 0. That is, there are essentially no 
effects on women’s political empowerment attributable to turning in one report. 
However, as Figure 5 demonstrates, increasing the number of times a country 
 
 86.  For a discussion of V-Dem and its Women’s Political Empowerment Index, see Kevin L. Cope 
et al., Patterns of Disagreement in State Repression Measures, POL. SCI. RES. AND METHODS  
(forthcoming 2018). Aksel Sundström et al., Women’s Political Empowerment: A New Global Index, 
1900–2012, (V-Dem Institute Working Paper Series, Paper No. 2015:19, 2016), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2704785## [https://perma.cc/3H2K-9JYD]. As a 
check, analyses using CIRI Women’s Economic and Political Rights measures were run. CIRI Women’s 
Economic Rights data include a series of sub-indicators relating to such matters as equal pay for equal 
work, the right to gainful employment without the need to obtain a husband’s or male relative’s consent, 
and non-discrimination with respect to hiring, promotion, and working conditions. Political Rights 
include the right to vote, run for and hold public office, join political organizations, and petition 
government officials. See Supplementary Materials, supra note 62, at 10–13. 
 87. Circles represent estimated effect of undergoing a single review (compared to not undergoing 
review) at time t and undergoing one additional review at time t, on Women’s Political Empowerment 
score at t+2. Lines denote 95% cluster-bootstrapped confidence intervals. For outcome model 
coefficients and respective bootstrapped confidence intervals see Supplementary Materials, supra note 
62, at 7–8. 
 88. All models include a linear time trend. Confidence intervals were obtained using a cluster 
bootstrap procedure for the entire two-stage weighting and MSM fitting procedure, clustering on 
country. The bootstrap was run for 20,000 iterations and took the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles of the 
bootstrapped distribution for the MSM parameter estimates.  
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previously engaged in CmEDAW review significantly increases the degree of 
Women’s Political Empowerment observed. We estimate that a country that 
receives one additional review throughout its history will, on average, have a 
women’s political empowerment score that is approximately 0.05 higher—a small 
but statistically significant effect. 
How sensitive are these results to unobserved confounders? Figure 6 presents 
results for a sensitivity analysis procedure.89 This study assumes unobserved 
confounding where countries that receive review and countries that do not 
differ in their underlying potential Women’s Political Empowerment score by α. 
This parameter denotes the amount of the difference in women’s political 
empowerment scores between treated (additional review) and untreated (no 
additional review) countries that can be explained by some unaccounted-for 
factor. The procedure varies α across a range of values and re-estimates the 
treatment history effect after adjusting for the assumed amount of unobserved 
confounding. α = 0 denotes the original effect estimate. Positive values of α   
denote situations where treated countries have better women’s political 
empowerment scores than control, while negative values of α assume treated 
countries have worse women’s rights records. 
The analysis demonstrates that for the estimated effect of review to no longer 
be significant at conventional levels (p < 0.05), countries undergoing an 
additional review would have to have systematically higher women’s political 
empowerment scores than countries that do not. Until  α = 0.06, a bit more than 
the treatment effect size, the estimated positive effect of reporting history 
remains statistically significant at p < 0.05. In other words, even if—due to 
unaccounted-for factors—countries undergoing an additional review had 
systematically better women’s political empowerment records by an amount 
slightly more than the effect size, it would still be possible to conclude with 
moderate confidence that review history has a positive effect on women’s 
political empowerment scores. 
89.  Blackwell, supra note 75.
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Figure 6: Sensitivity analysis for review history effect.90  
 
To summarize, governments that engage in more dialogue with the 
CmEDAW are more likely to cumulatively provide greater women’s 
fundamental rights. The very fact of participating in the review process may be 
an opening for constructive engagement with the treaty monitoring body that 
promises small and incremental improvements in women’s political 
empowerment over time. This opening seems to have important consequences, 
even if the quality of initial reporting is not especially high. These findings 
support the conclusion that constructive dialogue with the CmEDAW, as an 
ongoing process made possible by iterative report submission and conversation, 
holds the potential to improve rights practices on the ground. In this respect, 
periodic review under CEDAW has continuous, albeit small, positive effects on 
women’s rights attributable to the cumulative reporting cycle. 
 
 90. Dotted and dashed lines denote 90% and 95% cluster-bootstrapped confidence intervals 
respectively (20,000 iterations, clustering on country). 
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V 
EVIDENCE OF THE MECHANISMS: WOMEN’S RIGHTS IN LATIN AMERICA 
What mechanisms lead to the positive effects associated with reporting? One 
hypothesis is that the review process mobilizes domestic demands for closer 
scrutiny of and improvement to laws and practices surrounding women’s rights. 
If reporting impacts implementation, some evidence of the impact should be 
found at the domestic level. Specifically, we look for: mobilization of domestic 
civil society around reporting in the form of shadow reports; discussion of the 
reporting process in local media; and evidence that legislators begin to take note 
and consider how to improve treaty implementation through legislation. Thus, if 
the reporting process stimulates domestic policy change from the bottom up, the 
following three key activities should be apparent: political mobilization, public 
discourse, and legislative attention. 
For several reasons, this section focuses on Latin America.91 First, Latin 
American countries vary considerably in how regularly and promptly they engage 
in periodic review. Second, this is a region in which the strong influence of the 
Catholic Church within many countries makes women’s rights socially and 
politically salient. Combined with its history of relatively democratic institutions, 
active civil society, and meaningful press freedom, Latin America is a plausible 
candidate to investigate the potential for the periodic review process to focus 
public and political attention on women’s rights practices. 
A. Mobilization: Civil Society Shadow Reporting 
CEDAW ratification has had an influence on domestic politics by stimulating 
formation of women’s organizations, at least in some cases. In fact, memberships 
in women’s organizations increase post-ratification.92 This is because CEDAW 
helps to legitimize specific rights demands: those guaranteed by law. In addition, 
the CEDAW self-reporting procedure creates high-profile assessment 
opportunities. Women’s organizations—both local and transnational—take 
advantage of the reporting process to make these rights demands and hold their 
governments accountable for treaty implementation.93 
 
 91.  There is reason to believe that the domestic mechanisms discussed here have their counterparts 
in advanced democracies (see e.g,, FRAUKE LISA SEIDENSTICKER, EXAMINATION OF STATE 
REPORTING BY HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY BODIES: AN EXAMPLE OF FOLLOW-UP AT THE NATIONAL 
LEVEL BY NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS (DEU. 2005), 
https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/32911/ssoar-2005-seidensticker-
Examination_of_state_reporting_by.pdf?sequence=1 [https://perma.cc/Y3GU-24CA]. 
 92.  Even when controlling for country and year fixed effects, a time trend, and a lagged dependent 
variable, there is significant evidence that membership in women’s international non-governmental 
organizations grew in the first and second year after CEDAW ratification. SIMMONS, supra note 1, at 
210–11. 
 93.  Here, focus on non-governmental organization (NGO) shadow reporting is an example of 
mobilization of women’s groups, but it is important to recognize that international NGOs as well as 
Intergovernmental Organizations, such as the World Health Organization and the International Labor 
Organization, regularly take this opportunity to engage states on implementation steps. The point is not 
that domestic actors are the only ones to mobilize around reporting, but that the reporting regime in fact 
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When governments turn in their self-rendered reports, women’s groups 
regularly spring into action to correct, supplement, and criticize the official 
account of implementation progress. Indeed, the Committee has increasingly 
urged governments to consult with women’s civil society organizations (CSOs) 
when preparing their reports. The shadow reports of these CSOs constitute 
evidence that women’s groups have an active existence, are aware of CEDAW 
treaty obligations, and are motivated to monitor the implementation process. As 
such, they are a critical part of the conversation that links Geneva with domestic 
politics in states parties; they act as conduits for information flowing in both 
directions. 
Figure 7 displays the average number of shadow reports per state report 
received by the CmEDAW between 2007 and 2014,94 broken down by report 
type. While there is noticeable variance across years, there is an unmistakable 
upward trend in shadow reporting since about 2010. But do these reports reflect 
domestic mobilization around the reporting process, or rather international 
groups reporting from afar? For the 182 state reports submitted between 2007 
and 2014, CSOs provided the Committee with a total of 1,026 shadow reports, 
about a third of which (332) came from what can be considered a domestic CSO;95 
National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs) provided an alternative shadow 
report for only twenty-two of these 182 state reports. Moreover, domestic groups 
have contributed the most to the growth in reporting, especially since 2010. 
Interestingly, high-quality and responsive state reports were just about as likely 
to elicit shadow reporting as were low-quality and unresponsive official reports.96 
 
 
 
 
penetrates domestic politics where implementation policies ultimately take place. 
 94.  The OHCHR has yet to make available online shadow reports received before 2007. These data 
are tentatively reliable, in as much as they represent what is available on the OHCHR site. 
 95.  “Domestic CSOs” refer to organizations based in-country and that took primary responsibility 
for compiling the report, even if assisted by an international non-governmental organization (INGO). By 
contrast, “international CSOs” are not based in-country and operate on a (near-)global scale. 
 96.  See Supplementary Materials, supra note 62, at 18–20. 
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Figure 7: Average number of Shadow Reports submitted per State Report 
(2008-2014).97  
 
 A close examination of the shadow reports from Latin American countries 
indicates that domestic civil society actors are willing to point out the 
shortcomings in the state reports and explain to the CmEDAW exactly how their 
government has fallen short. For Argentina’s 2010 periodic review, for example, 
domestic CSOs contested Argentina’s implementation by revealing the inaction 
on the part of the government to use data to guide public policy pertaining to 
women’s health and trafficking.98 Many of the shadow reports emphasize the lack 
of effective implementation of laws and policies to improve women’s health and 
security. For example, domestic CSOs exposed the abuses of women in prisons 
at the hands of male prison staff, an issue scarcely noted in the Argentine state 
report.99 The CmEDAW itself takes such input seriously and often incorporates 
 
 97.  Based on shadow reports posted to the UN Treaty Body Database, available at: 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/ [https://perma.cc/7MXP-DZZ4] (last accessed January 30, 2018). 
 98.  Equipo Latinoamericano de Justicia y Género (ELA), Center on Housing Rights and Evictions 
(COHRE), the Programa “Género, Sociedad y Universidad”, Secretaría de Extensión de la Universidad 
Nacional del Litoral (“Programa de Género”), Acción por los derechos en el Noroeste (ADN), and the 
Asociación por los Derechos Civiles (ADC), “Shadow Report for the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women,” 46th Session (July 2010), http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/ 
[https://perma.cc/LF5P-LG2S]. 
 99.  Joint CSO Submission, “Women’s Human Rights: Argentine State Pending Debts,” Alternative 
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this information into its recommendations.100 
Shadow reports indicate mobilized women’s groups elsewhere in Latin 
America as well. In response to Brazil’s 2012 state report, anti-human trafficking 
groups exposed the continuing gaps in the country’s law to address domestic 
trafficking and prostitution of women.101 A broad coalition of women’s groups in 
Chile supplied information on the underreporting of violence and crime against 
women, and pointed to the government’s failure to implement laws on the books: 
including criminalizing femicide, advancing anti-trafficking awareness, and 
facilitating access to modern forms of contraception and other kinds of women’s 
reproductive health care.102 Neglect of violence against women, femicide, and 
disappearances of women and girls—in conjunction with the inadequate official 
response—was a central theme of Mexico’s National Citizens’ Observatory on 
Feminicide.103 In Uruguay, human rights organizations pressed the government 
to incorporate the CEDAW’s definition of discrimination against women, and to 
create national plans to achieve objectives from women’s access to justice to 
health care.104 Uruguay’s National Human Rights Institute sent the Committee a 
separate shadow report as well.105 During Venezuela’s seventh and eighth reviews 
(which were combined into one report in 2014), nine separate shadow reports 
were received—some from broad coalitions—covering topics from LGBTQ 
 
Report from CSOs in Connection with the Submission of the Sixth Periodic Report of the States Parties 
(CEDAW/C/ARG/6) to the Committee for the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against 
Women, 46th Period of Sessions (2010), http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/ [https://perma.cc/4DS3-YALQ]. 
 100.  Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 46th Sess., Conclusions and 
Recommendations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women: Argentina, ¶ 
28, U.N. DOC. CEDAW/C/ARG/CO/6 (13 July 2010), http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/ 
[https://perma.cc/4DS3-YALQ]. 
 101.  Coalition against Trafficking in Women, “Information on Brazil for consideration by the 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women at its 51st Session” Jan. 25, 2012, 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/ [https://perma.cc/4DS3-YALQ]. 
 102.  Articulación Feminista por la Libertad de Decidir, “Chile: Shadow Report to the UN 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women,” 53 Session, Oct. 2012, 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/ [https://perma.cc/4DS3-YALQ]. Many of these issues were echoed in the 
summary records and the concluding observations. See Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women, 53rd Sess., Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women: Chile, ¶¶ 12, 20, 22, U.N. DOC. CEDAW/C/CHL/CO/5-6 (Oct. 2, 2012), 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/ [https://perma.cc/4DS3-YALQ]. 
 103.  National Citizens’ Observatory on Feminicide, “Submission to the United Nations Committee 
on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women with Regard to the Consideration of the Combined 
7th and 8th Periodic Report of Mexico.” June 2012, http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/ [https://perma.cc/4DS3-
YALQ]. These concerns are explicitly mentioned in the CmEDAW’s concluding observations. See, e.g., 
Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 52nd Sess., Conclusions and 
Recommendations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women: Mexico, ¶¶ 15, 
17, 20, U.N. DOC. CEDAW/C/MEX/CO/7-8 (July 17, 2012), http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/ 
[https://perma.cc/4DS3-YALQ]. 
 104.   Latin American and the Caribbean Committee for the Defense of Women’s Rights, et al., 
“Alternative Report for the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women,” May 26, 
2016, http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/ [https://perma.cc/4DS3-YALQ]. 
 105.  “Report by the National Institution of Human Rights of Uruguay,” June 10, 2016, 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/ [https://perma.cc/4DS3-YALQ]. 
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rights to equal access to health care for women.106 
In sum, shadow reports are authentic and critical domestic efforts to hold 
governments accountable for implementation of their obligations under 
CEDAW. These reports are the foot print that CSOs leave of their concerns 
about state implementation of women’s rights obligations. Some of these reports 
require considerable research, consultation, and collective action. As such, they 
represent the mobilization of groups and organizations to press governments for 
implementation and compliance. 
B. Information: Coverage of Periodic Review in Domestic Media 
To be meaningful domestically, there must be some public awareness of the 
existence of review and the issues it entails. To establish whether such public 
awareness exists, we searched the major local press outlets of fifteen Latin 
American countries for mention of the reporting-and-review process.107 Each 
news article was coded for whether it mentioned the focal state’s CEDAW 
obligations, the CmEDAW, and/or the reporting and review process specifically. 
If the constructive dialogue with the Committee is largely invisible to domestic 
publics, little to no reference to any of these topics in the local press should 
appear. But if such dialogue matters to domestic audiences, a spike in press 
references, followed by a somewhat higher degree of attention in the news to 
CEDAW and the CmEDAW during and after the review year should be 
apparent. 
Media evidence collected is generally consistent with the hypothesis that the 
conversations initiated by the periodic review process between Latin American 
governments and the CmEDAW have had important reverberations in the local 
press, at least in Argentina and Mexico, and slightly less so in Chile, Uruguay, 
and Venezuela. Figure 8 demonstrates strong evidence of a spike in attention by 
the local press in these countries to the review process, particularly during the 
year of in-person review (year 0). 
 
 
 106.  See shadow reports posted under Venezuela’s 7-8th CmEDAW review on the UN Treaty Body 
Database, http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/ [https://perma.cc/4DS3-YALQ]. 
 107.  The countries for which a reliable and searchable media database could be found include: 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, 
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. The top three newspapers (by circulation) were 
identified using www.pressreference.com [https://perma.cc/QQ8A-8FNU], supplemented with queries to 
regional and country experts or citizens. It was not possible to search electronically all three outlets for 
every single year since the CEDAW entered into force, but in each case as many years as possible from 
1982 to the present were searched. Using three specific combinations of search terms in Spanish and 
Portuguese (“CEDAW”, “convención AND discriminación AND mujer”, and “comité AND 
discriminación AND mujer”) all news articles mentioning the CEDAW, the CmEDAW, and/or the 
periodic review process were collected. This study only collected and coded articles published by a 
newspaper within and about the reporting state. No media stories for states prior to their ratification of 
CmEDAW were collected, but a search for them regardless of whether or not a state had in fact met its 
reporting obligation(s) was performed. 
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Figure 8: Domestic Media Coverage of CEDAW and CmEDAW review in 
Latin America.108 
 
Argentina has been incredibly diligent about submitting its CEDAW reports, 
with all seven reports due submitted within two years of the due date.109 
Argentina also has a large private media sector, although the relationship 
between the press and both Kirchner administrations was particularly tense. 
 
 108. Figure 8 indicates the number of domestic newspaper articles that reference the CEDAW, the 
CmEDAW, or the in-person periodic review and/or the concluding observations and recommendations 
issued by the CmEDAW (Periodic Review). References are averaged over the number of CmEDAW 
reviews (CEDAW reports) undertaken by each country within its searchable time period. References 
are centered around the year of review (0). For Argentina, the searchable period is 1996-2014 and 
covered 3 CmEDAW reviews. For Brazil, the searchable period is 2003-2014 and covered 3 CmEDAW 
reviews. For Chile and Mexico, the searchable period is 2005-2014, and covered 2 CmEDAW reviews for 
each country. For Uruguay and Venezuela, the searchable period is 2002-present, and covered 2 
CmEDAW reviews for each country. 
 109.  For efficiency’s sake, the CmEDAW sometimes reviews two state reports in one session; thus 
Argentina has only appeared before the Committee and received recommendations five times (in 1988, 
1997, 2002, 2010, and 2016). 
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Searches of the two most influential national daily newspapers, Clarín and La 
Nación, generated strong evidence for domestic reverberation of the periodic 
review process. La Nación is considered to have a respectably center-right 
editorial position and is often viewed as the smart, conservative mainstream 
paper of Argentina.110 During the searchable period, this paper referenced 
CEDAW a total of twenty-five times, though only two of these articles 
referenced the CmEDAW. Much of this coverage is of the contentious 2007 
ratification of CEDAW’s Optional Protocol. The protocol was strongly opposed 
by the Catholic Church, which viewed the individual communication procedure 
as a step toward the decriminalization of abortion.111 Interestingly and contrary 
to expectation, none of the La Nación articles searched discuss the 2010 periodic 
review process. 
In line with expectations, however, the relatively middle-of-the-road 
publication Clarín referenced CEDAW fifty-six times during the searchable 
period, fifteen of which discuss the periodic review process. Many of these articles 
cover the shadow reporting conducted by domestic civil society organizations,112 
but some are critical of the government’s lack of implementation of CEDAW 
obligations and Committee recommendations.113 For instance, an editorial in 
1998 considered that four bills before the legislature intended to emphasize the 
self-determination of rape victims and to criminalize other types of sexual 
assaults fell far short of CmEDAW’s 1997 recommendations.114 In a society 
where the political influence of the Catholic Church is strong, the vast majority 
of articles on CEDAW and Committee recommendations unsurprisingly discuss 
those relating to family planning policies and the decriminalization of abortion. 
Much of the Mexican media coverage is highly critical of the state of women’s 
rights in Mexico, and quite specific about the CmEDAW recommendations to 
improve. For example, El Universal covered the CmEDAW’s critical questioning 
of the Mexican representative during the periodic review of August 2006.115 
Follow-up articles noted CmEDAW and other pressures on Mexico to address 
homicides and disappearances of women in Ciudad Juaréz.116 Several articles 
followed the CmEDAW review of Mexico’s report in 2012, mentioning its 
specific recommendations to implement measures to protect female journalists 
from violence117 and to publicize the CEDAW by translating it into thirteen 
indigenous languages.118 
 
 110.  See, e.g., Carlos Ares, El periódico conservador argentino ‘La Nación’ ha cumplido 115 años, EL 
PAÍS (Mex.), Jan. 6, 1985. 
 111.  Critican que se apruebe una ley que dara luz verde a todo tipo de abortos, LA NACIÓN (Mex.), 
Nov. 16, 2006. 
 112.  La situación de la mujer en la Argentina, CLARÍN (Mex.), Aug. 7, 2002. 
 113.  Una pesada deuda con las mujeres, CLARÍN (Mex.), Sept. 28, 2002. 
 114.  La mujer de hoy y sus problemas, CLARÍN (Mex.), Mar. 12, 1998. 
 115.  Critican al país por la violencia de género, EL UNIVERSAL (Mex.), Aug. 18, 2006. 
 116.  La ONU critica rezagos en el país para proteger a mujeres, EL UNIVERSAL (Mex.), Sept. 7, 2006. 
 117.  Propondrá PAN evaluación a funcionarios electos, EL UNIVERSAL (Mex.), Sept. 26, 2013. 
 118.  Traducen para indígenas instrumentos para respeto a DH de mujeres, EL UNIVERSAL (Mex.), 
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Like Argentina, Chile has submitted all of its reports—most of relatively high 
quality—on or soon after the due date.119 Chile’s traditionally active press, closely 
tied to the country’s competitive political parties, has been reasonably attentive 
to this review process. The country’s most influential, center-right publication, El 
Mercurio (searchable from 2005-2015) has covered Committee recommendations 
in a relatively neutral tone. For instance, a couple of articles provide balanced 
coverage of CmEDAW’s lengthy questioning of the Director of the National 
Service for Women (SERNAM), Laura Albornoz, in 2006. Albornoz is quoted 
as stating “clearly and emphatically that legislating on abortion or 
decriminalization is not contemplated within the government program of 
President Bachelet.”120 As within a number of other countries in Latin America, 
press coverage tends to focus on the legal status of abortion and a country’s 
relationship with CEDAW. 
Coverage of CmEDAW review in Brazil, Uruguay and Venezuela is 
considerably less frequent. Publications within these countries, when discussing 
women’s rights, tend to reference Inter-American obligations rather than the UN 
regime. In Uruguay, the conservative El Pais and the center-left La Republica 
provided scattered coverage of CmEDAW reviews, largely in relation to other 
international obligations. In Venezuela, one of Caracas’ most influential dailies—
El Nacional (searchable from 2002-2015)—only references CmEDAW review 
twice, but provides strong coverage of activities of the National Institute of 
Women (Inamujer) and local NGOs working toward gender equality. 
Overall, the press in Latin American countries facilitates robust information 
and even debate about the reporting and review process. This suggests that a 
causal mechanism linking the reporting process to domestic information, 
awareness, and eventual mobilization varies across countries, but overall is highly 
plausible. 
C. Political Attention: Self-Reporting in Legislative Debates 
A number of CEDAW obligations—from criminalizing gender-based 
violence to prohibiting gender discrimination in public educational systems—
depend on implementing legislation. The centrality of the legislature to ensuring 
treaty compliance has been recognized by the Committee itself. This section 
looks for evidence that legislatures are aware of CEDAW obligations and the 
CmEDAW itself. The iterative influence of the reporting process suggests that 
legislators should draw on the Committee’s recommendations soon after a 
country’s review and that these references should cumulate over time. To this 
end, examination of the content of legislative debates should reveal evidence that 
 
Aug. 20, 2013. 
 119.  Thus far, the Chilean government has appeared before the CmEDAW for periodic review four 
times (1995, 1999, 2006, 2012), typically led by the Director of the National Service for Women 
(SERNAM). 
 120.  En Resumen, EL MERCURIO (Chile), Aug. 17, 2006; Poli Notas, EL MERCURIO (Chile), Dec. 2, 
2006. 
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laws relating to women’s rights were nudged by the substance of CmDAW’s 
recommendations or concluding observations. The self-reporting process should 
link to legislative debates over gender-focused laws, constituting one pathway 
through which periodic self-reporting and review under CEDAW impacts 
women’s rights on the ground. We focus on Argentina, Chile, Mexico and 
Uruguay, four major Latin American countries for which a significant legislative 
history is available online. 
1. Argentina 
 Argentina roughly fits expectations for a state whose dialogue with the 
CmEDAW has made a mark on legislative activity. Figure 9 demonstrates that 
attention to CEDAW in the legislature has surged in three distinct swells 
following review, growing with each round of interaction with the CmEDAW. In 
two of three reporting years, there are references to the committee and/or its 
recommendations. In 2013, more than a quarter of all legislative sessions included 
at least one reference to CEDAW, and more than ten per cent of all sessions that 
year contained at least one mention of the Committee, its recommendations, or 
the review process itself. 
Figure 9: References to the CEDAW regime within Argentina’s legislature 
(2001-2016).121 
 
 
 121. Figure displays the percentage of all sessions held by the Senate and Chamber of Deputies in a 
given year in which at least one legislator referenced the CEDAW regime, categorized by reference type: 
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Following its 2002 CEDAW review and 2004 follow-up, the new government 
undertook a number of legislative reforms to further implement CEDAW 
obligations and to mitigate the effects of the economic crisis on women.122 For 
example, in supporting the creation of a National Program for Sexual Health and 
Responsible Procreation, Senator Gomez de Bertone (Partido Justicialista) 
noted that despite the fact that CmEDAW had forgiven (se le perdonan) 
Argentina for many implementation deficiencies due to the economic crisis, it 
had strongly recommended the enactment of this bill.123 
Furthermore, legislators within both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies 
referenced CEDAW obligations (and the Committee’s General 
Recommendations) when discussing bills or programs. Legislators cited specific 
CEDAW provisions and CmEDAW General Recommendation 19 when 
discussing modification of the penal code to incorporate violence against women 
or femicide,124 the Comprehensive Law on the Prevention, Punishment and 
Elimination of Violence against Women in their Interpersonal Relations (2009) 
and its further implementation,125 and data collection for sexual crimes.126 
Frequent references to specific CEDAW provisions and one reference to 
CmEDAW recommendations have also been made in debates over bills 
addressing sexual and reproductive health services,127 which was a specific focus 
 
the treaty itself (CEDAW); the CmEDAW; or the periodic review process/recommendations. Horizontal 
dashed lines represent years in which Argentina either submitted a Report or the CmEDAW issued its 
concluding observations (Review). 
 122.  This included ratification of the CEDAW Optional Protocol (Mar. 2007); adoption of a 
Comprehensive Law on the Prevention, Punishment and Elimination of Violence against Women in their 
Interpersonal Relations (Law 26,485 (2009)), which covers all forms of gender-based violence, including 
physical, psychological, sexual, economic and patrimonial violence, and creates the Observatory on 
Violence; ratification of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the 
two Palermo protocols thereto by means of Law 25,632, and the adoption in April 2008 of the Law on 
the Prevention and Punishment of Trafficking in Persons (Law 26,364 (2008)), which amends the 
Criminal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure and prohibits and punishes all forms of trafficking 
in persons. See U.N. Secretary-General, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination 
of Discrimination Against Women, ¶ 46, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/ARG/CO/6 (Aug. 16, 2010). 
 123.  República Argentina, Cámara de Senadores de la Nación, Versión Taquigráfica, Perído 120o, 31a 
Reunión, 16a Sesión ordinaria (Oct. 30, 2002); Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women, Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women: Argentina, U.N. DOC. A/57/38(SUPP) (Aug. 23, 2002), ¶ 361. 
 124.  República Argentina, Cámara de Senadores de la Nación, Versión Taquigráfica, Período 130o, 
2a Reunión, 1a Sesión ordinaria (Mar. 14, 2012); República Argentina, Cámara de Senadores de la Nación, 
Versión Taquigráfica, Período 130o, 16a Reunión, 11a Sesión ordinaria (Oct. 3, 2012); República 
Argentina, Cámara de Senadores de la Nación, Versión Taquigráfica, Período 134o, 8a Reunión, 2a Sesión 
ordinaria (June 8, 2016); República Argentina, Cámara de Diputados de la Nación, Dirección de 
Taquígrafos, Período 130, 5a Reunión, Sesión ordinaria (Apr. 18, 2012). 
 125.  República Argentina, Cámara de Senadores de la Nación, Versión Taquigráfica, Período 133o, 
5a Reunión, 4a Sesión ordinaria (July 1, 2015). 
 126.  República Argentina, Cámara de Diputados de la Nación, Dirección de Taquígrafos, Período 
131, 8a Reunión, 6a Sesión ordinaria (July 3, 2013). 
 127.  República Argentina, Cámara de Senadores de la Nación, Versión Taquigráfica, Período 131o, 
6a Reunión, 2a Sesión ordinaria (Apr. 24, 2013); República Argentina, Cámara de Senadores de la Nación, 
Versión Taquigráfica, Período 131o, 12a Reunión, 6a Sesión ordinaria (July 3, 2013); República Argentina, 
Cámara de Diputados de la Nación, Dirección de Taquígrafos, Período 130, 11a Reunión, 8a Sesión 
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of the Committee’s concluding observations.128 
2. Chile 
Chile has a strong history of attention to the status of women in society.129 The 
government has been a reliable self-reporter that typically engages actively with 
the CmEDAW. Chile also elected its first female President in 2006, Michelle 
Bachelet of the center-left Socialist Party (Partido Socialista de Chile), who 
achieved gender parity within her first Cabinet. 
Chile’s legislature has not been as explicitly tuned to the CmEDAW as has 
the executive, however. Chile’s legislative debates resemble Argentina’s, though 
without as obvious a cumulative effect over time. Although mentions of CEDAW 
in the legislature are not as frequent as is the case in Argentina, legislative 
attention does appear to increase slightly after every review year, with a fairly 
steady increase in legislative attention since 2011. In particular, mentions of 
review and/or recommendations have recently increased. 
 
ordinaria (June 27, 2012); 127. República Argentina, Cámara de Diputados de la Nación, Dirección de 
Taquígrafos, Período 131, 6a Reunión, 5a Sesión ordinaria (June 5, 2013). 
 128.  Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 46th Sess., Consideration of 
reports submitted by States parties under article 18 of the Convention, ¶ 38, U.N. DOC. CEDAW/C/SR.926 
(July, 13 2010). 
 129.  Chile has long focused on the status of women in society, having established as early as 1949 a 
Legal Office for Women, followed by the National Office for Women in 1951. However, in the 1970s, 
with the transition to military rule, a National Secretariat for Women formed mainly to promote the 
military regime’s ideology. When Chile transitioned to democracy in 1990, cultural debate over women’s 
issues had effectively been non-existent for 20 years. Nevertheless, on the heels of democratic transition, 
advances in the status of women were led by the National Office for Women’s Affairs (SERNAM), 
established in January 1991. SERNAM was a public agency whose Director held ministerial rank as a 
member of the Presidential Cabinet. 
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Figure 10: References to the CEDAW regime within Chile’s legislature (1999-
2016).130 
 
CEDAW has been brought into discussions relating to wage equality, the 
decriminalization of abortion, and the minimum age for marriage.131  The 
persistent wage and employment gap between women and men, despite women’s 
higher education levels, has been an area of concern for the Committee since 
Chile’s transition to democracy.132 In 2008 and again in 2012, Senators drew on 
CmEDAW’s recommendations to support legislation that modified the Labor 
Code to safeguard the right to equality in remuneration.133 The Committee has 
also consistently urged the Chilean legislature to amend laws relating to abortion 
 
 130. Figure 10 displays the percentage of all sessions held by the Senate and Chamber of Deputies in 
a given year in which at least one legislator referenced the CEDAW regime, categorized by reference 
type: the treaty itself (CEDAW); the CmEDAW; or the periodic review process/recommendations. 
Horizontal dashed lines represent years in which Chile either submitted a Report or the CmEDAW 
issued its concluding observations (Review). 
 131.  See Concluding Observations, U.N. DOC. CEDAW/C/CHI/CO/4 (Aug. 16, 2006), ¶¶ 21–22; 
Chamber Leg 355 Session 59; Chamber Leg 362 Session 113 (Jan. 13, 2015). 
 132.  U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., Concluding Observations, ¶ 109, U.N. DOC. A/50/38 (Jan. 24, 1995), ¶ 
109; Comm. On the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 36th Sess., Concluding comments, ¶¶ 
11–12, U.N. DOC. CEDAW/C/CHI/CO/4 (Aug. 16, 2006); Comm. On the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women, 20th Sess., Concluding comments, ¶¶ 32–33, U.N. DOC. CEDAW/C/CHI/CO/5-6 (Oct. 
2, 2012). 
 133.  Senate Leg 356 Session 36 (July 15, 2018). Boletín 4356-13, became a law in 2009. Law No. 20348, 
June 19, 2009, D.O.; Chamber Leg 364 Session 2 (Mar. 16, 2016). 
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to permit pregnancy termination for therapeutic or health reasons.134 
Controversial debates within the legislature during the 2000s over whether and 
how to decriminalize abortion ultimately led to the adoption of a law in 2017 to 
do so in instances of rape, danger to the life of the mother, or danger to the life 
of the fetus.135 The bill was initially introduced by President Bachelet, and 
justified with reference to CmEDAW’s (and other’s) recommendations.136 She 
reminded legislators “[o]ur country cannot avoid these recommendations by 
postponing a decision, nor can it continue to ignore the serious violation of rights 
that this situation poses.”137 These recommendations and the need for Chile to 
fulfill its international obligations were relied upon by deputies, particularly from 
the Socialist Party, supporting the proposed bill during its subsequent debate.138 
3. Mexico 
Mexico exhibits precisely the pattern one might expect if the process of self-
reporting and Committee review is salient in legislative activity. Mexican 
legislators have referred to CEDAW obligations and Committee 
recommendations when legislating on women’s rights more frequently than 
others in the region, particularly during the last decade. Yet in the first twenty 
years after ratifying CEDAW, discrimination and violence against women 
remained a persistent problem in Mexico. Following the democratic transition in 
2000, the new government instituted constitutional reforms that prohibited 
gender discrimination and established the National Women’s Institute 
(INMUJERES) in 2001. The following year, INMUJERES submitted thirty 
pieces of legislation on questions affecting women, including political 
participation, sexual harassment, social security, job discrimination and 
violence.139 
Despite these efforts, violence against women has remained a serious concern 
of the CmEDAW and featured prominently in their 2002, 2006, and 2012 reviews 
 
 134.  U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., ¶ 229, U.N. DOC. A/54/38/REV. 1(SUPP) (Jan. 22, 1999), ¶ 229; 
Comm. On the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 36th Sess., Concluding comments, ¶¶ 19–
20, U.N. DOC. CEDAW/C/CHI/CO/4 (Aug. 16, 2006); Comm. On the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women, 20th Sess., Concluding comments, ¶¶ 34–35, U.N. DOC. CEDAW/C/CHI/CO/5-6 (Oct. 
2, 2012). 
 135.  Law No. 21030, Regula  la  despenalización  de  la  interrupción  voluntaria  del 
embarazo  en  tres  causales, Sept. 23, 2017, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.]. 
 136.  Mensage No. 1230-362, Mensage de S.E. La Presidenta de la Republica con el que Inicia un 
Proyecto de Ley que Regula la Despenalización de la Interrupción Voluntaria del embarazo en Tres 
Causales, Jan. 31, 2015 [hereinafter Mensage No 1230-362]. 
 137.  Mensage No. 1230-362, supra note 1366. Liv período legislativo, legislatura 361, sesion 22, May 
1, 2013, 172–173. See also reference to these recommendations within a report on the proposed bill by 
the parliamentary Committee on Health (Comisión de Salud), Liv período legislativo, legislatura 363, 
sesion 72, Sept. 29, 2015, and the Committee on the Constitution, Legislation, Justice, and Regulation 
(Comisión de Constitución, Legislación, Justicia y Regulamento), Liv período legislativo, legislatura 364, 
sesion 1, Mar. 15, 2016. 
 138.  Liv período legislativo, legislatura 364, sesion 4, Mar. 17, 2016. 
 139.  Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Exceptional Sess., Consideration 
of reports submitted by States parties under article 18 of the Convention, ¶¶ 3–4, U.N. DOC. 
CEDAW/C/SR.569 (Aug. 6, 2002). 
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and concluding observations.140 These concerns did not go unnoticed by 
legislators in Mexico, particularly those from the Party of the Democratic 
Revolution (PRD) and the minority Labor and Citizen’s Movement parties.141 In 
2009, Deputy Humberto Dávila Esquivel (New Alliance Party) proposed a bill to 
harmonize the concept of family violence in the Federal Civil Code with 
CEDAW and the provisions of the General Law on Women’s Access to a Life 
Free of Violence. He mentioned the CmEDAW’s 2006 recommendations to do 
just this.142 However, the bill died almost immediately. Similarly, when speaking 
in favor of a call by the Commission for Gender Equality for three Mexican state 
congresses to criminalize the offence of femicide, Senator Angélica de la Peña 
Gómez (PRD) cited CmEDAW’s recommendations regarding this issue.143 More 
successfully, adopted reforms of the 2007 Law of Access of Women to a Life Free 
From Violence (Ley General de Accesso de las Mujeres a una Vida Libre de 
Violencia),144 proposed and supported by Senators Gloria Bautista Cuevas 
(PRD)145 and María Candelaria Ochoa Ávalos (Citizen’s Movement),146 relied on 
CmEDAW’s recommendations for how to strengthen this law. CmEDAW 
recommendations have also been drawn on to support gender-related reforms of 
 
 140.  U.N. GAOR, 57th Sess., Conclusions and recommendations of the Committee on the Elimination 
of Discrimination against Women: Argentina, ¶¶ 431–32, U.N. Doc. A/57/38(SUPP) (Aug. 6, 2002); 
Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 36th Sess., Conclusions and 
recommendations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women: Argentina, ¶¶ 
14–15, U.N. DOC. CEDAW/C/MEX/CO/6 (Aug. 17, 2006); Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women, 52nd Sess., Conclusions and recommendations of the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women: Argentina, ¶¶ 15–19, U.N. DOC. CEDAW/C/MEX/CO/7-8 (Jul. 17, 
2012). 
 141.  See, e.g., La Cámara de Diputados del Congreso de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, Diario de 
los Debates, Legislatura LX, Año I, Primer Período Ordinario, Número de Diario 27 (Nov. 21, 2006); La 
Cámara de Diputados del Congreso de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, Diario de los Debates, Legislatura 
LX, Año III, Segundo Período Ordinario, Número de Diario 13 (Mar. 10, 2009); La Cámara de Senadores 
del Congreso de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, Versiones Estenográficas, Legislatura LXII, Año II, 
(Feb. 13, 2014); Senado de la República, Comisión Permanente del H. Congreso de la Unión, Versiones 
Estenográficas, Legislatura LXII, Año III, Segundo Receso, No. 22 (Aug. 19, 2015). 
 142.   La Cámara de Diputados del Congreso de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, Diario de los Debates, 
Legislatura LX, Año III, Segundo Período Ordinario, Número de Diario 9 (Feb. 24, 2009). 
 143.  La Cámara de Senadores del Congreso de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, Versiones 
Estenográficas, Legislatura LXII, Año II, Sesión Ordinaria (Sept. 5, 2013). 
 144.  Ley General de Accesso de las Mujeres a una Vida Libre de Violencia [LGAMVLV], Nueva 
Ley publicada en el Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 1-2-2007, últimas reformas DOF 17-12-2015 
(Mex.). 
 145.  La Cámara de Senadores del Congreso de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, Versiones 
Estenográficas, Legislatura LXII, Año III, Sesión Ordinaria (June 24, 2015). 
 146.  La Cámara de Diputados del Congreso de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, Diario de los Debates, 
Legislatura LXIII, Año I, Primer Período Ordinario, Número de Diario 13 (Oct. 8, 2015). 
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labor laws,147 health policies,148 and government institutions,149 among other 
topics. 
 
Figure 11: References to the CEDAW regime within Mexico’s Congress (2000-
2016).150 
  
 
 147.  La Cámara de Diputados del Congreso de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, Diario de los Debates, 
Legislatura LXIII, Año I, Primer Período Ordinario, Número de Diario 36 (Dec. 15, 2015); La Cámara 
de Senadores del Congreso de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, Versiones Estenográficas, Legislatura LXI, 
Año III, Sesión Ordinaria (Nov. 11, 2008). 
 148.  La Cámara de Senadores del Congreso de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, Versiones 
Estenográficas, Legislatura LX, Año I, Sesión Ordinaria (Feb. 1, 2007); La Cámara de Senadores del 
Congreso de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, Versiones Estenográficas, Legislatura LX, Año I, Sesión 
Ordinaria (Apr. 24, 2007); La Cámara de Senadores del Congreso de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, 
Versiones Estenográficas, Legislatura LXII, Año II, Sesión Ordinaria (May 13, 2014). 
 149.  La Cámara de Senadores del Congreso de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, Versiones 
Estenográficas, Legislatura LXIII, Año I, Sesión Ordinaria (Feb. 17, 2016); La Cámara de Senadores del 
Congreso de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, Versiones Estenográficas, Legislatura LXIII, Año I, Sesión 
Ordinaria (Apr. 12, 2016); La Cámara de Senadores del Congreso de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, 
Versiones Estenográficas, Legislatura LXIII, Año I, Sesión Ordinaria (Aug. 10, 2016). 
 150. Figure displays the percentage of all sessions held by the Senate and Chamber of Deputies in a 
given year in which at least one legislator referenced the CEDAW regime, categorized by reference type: 
the treaty itself (CEDAW); the CmEDAW; or the periodic review process/recommendations. Horizontal 
dashed lines represent years in which Mexico either submitted a Report or the CmEDAW issued its 
concluding observations (Review). 
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4. Uruguay 
Uruguay was among the first Latin American countries to enfranchise women 
(in 1937), ratify CEDAW (1981), establish an office to deal with women’s 
concerns (1991),151 and sign on to CEDAW’s Optional Protocol (2001). Despite 
this strong political commitment to (international) women’s rights, legislative 
references to CEDAW are sparse and recently on the decline. 
Figure 12: References to the CEDAW regime within Uruguay’s legislature 
(2000-2016).152 
 
Even so, references to the CmEDAW and its recommendations have 
featured regularly in Uruguayan legislative discussions. For example, at least one 
Senator referenced CmEDAW’s 2002 recommendations153 when debating a bill 
 
 151.  The National Institute for Family and Women’s Affairs was replaced in 2002 by the National 
Women’s Institute, created under the Ministry of Social Development, Law No. 17.866, Art. 6, to act as 
the governing body for gender policies, and is responsible, under Law No. 17930, Dec. 19, 2005, for 
fulfilling the state’s international obligations relating to non-discrimination on the basis of gender. 
 152. Figure displays the percentage of all sessions held by the Senate and House of Representatives 
in a given year in which at least one legislator referenced the CEDAW regime, categorized by reference 
type: the treaty itself (CEDAW); the CmEDAW; or the periodic review process/recommendations. 
Horizontal dashed lines represent years in which Uruguay either submitted a Report or the CmEDAW 
issued its concluding observations (Review). 
 153.  U.N. GAOR, 57th Sess., Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women: Uruguay, ¶¶ 186–87, U.N. DOC. A/57/38(SUPP) (Jan. 24, 
2002). 
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defining gender discrimination and promoting equal opportunities and rights.154  
CmEDAW’s 2002 concluding observations also made a number of specific 
recommendations, including repeal of a law mitigating rape charges when the 
person who committed the offense married the victim.155 The Committee’s “harsh 
criticism”156 sparked renewed discussion of Penal Code reform and a bill was 
introduced in the Senate the following year.157 During all subsequent discussions 
of the bill in the Senate158 and the Chamber of Deputies159 elimination of this 
provision was framed as necessary to respond to the Committee’s 
recommendation. The rape mitigation provision was repealed on December 29, 
2005.160 
The low rate of political participation by women in Uruguay also caught the 
attention of the CmEDAW. During its 2008 review, one Committee member 
indicated that it was “lamentable that nearly 30 years after Uruguay’s accession 
to the Convention, so few women were involved in politics or occupied decision-
making positions.”161 The Uruguay government representative cited cultural 
resistance to quotas,162 but also noted that the Committee’s recommendations 
“would undoubtedly help to raise awareness of Uruguay’s shortcomings in terms 
of women’s political. . . participation.”163 Legislators within both the Senate164 and 
 
 154.  Diario de Sesiones, camara de senadores XLVI (third period), sesion 1, Mar. 6, 2007; the bill 
became Law No. 18104, Mar. 6, 2007. 
 155.  Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 26th Sess., Consideration of 
reports submitted by States parties under article 18 of the Convention, ¶ 14, U.N. DOC. CEDAW/C/SR.541 
(Jan. 24, 2002); U.N. GAOR, 57th Sess., Conclusions and recommendations of the Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women: Uruguay, ¶¶ 196–7, U.N. DOC. A/57/38(SUPP) (Jan. 24, 
2002). During its in-person dialogue with the Committee, the Uruguayan delegate recognized that the 
provision was a “vestige of a former time” and so “no longer used, and therefore no one had taken the 
trouble to have it revoked.” Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 26th Sess., 
Consideration of reports submitted by States parties under article 18 of the Convention, ¶. 29, U.N. DOC. 
CEDAW/C/SR.541 (Jan. 24, 2002). 
 156.  Diario de Sesiones, legislatura XLVI, first period, sesion 1, p. 81, Dec. 21, 2005. 
 157.  Diario de Sesiones, camara de senadores XLV, fourth period, sesion 2, Mar. 11, 2003. 
 158.  Diario de Sesiones, camara de senadores XLVI, first period, sesion 37, Aug. 10, 2005; Diario de 
Sesiones, legislatura XLVI (first period), sesion 48, Oct. 4, 2005. 
 159.  Diario de Sesiones, legislatura XLV, fifth period, sesion 12, Apr. 1, 2004; Diario de Sesiones, 
legislatura XLVI, first period, sesion 1, Dec. 21, 2005. 
 160.  Law No. 17938, Dec. 29, 2005. 
 161.  Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 42nd Sess., Consideration of 
reports submitted by States parties under article 18 of the Convention, ¶ 2, U.N. DOC. CEDAW/C/SR.857 
(Oct. 23, 2008). In fact, the Committee expressed concern that women “continue to be underrepresented 
in public and political life,” with the proportion of women in Parliament falling from 11.5 to 10.8% in the 
2004 elections. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 42nd Sess., Conclusions 
and recommendations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women: Uruguay, 
¶ 30, U.N. DOC. CEDAW/C/URY/CO/7 (Oct. 23, 2008). 
 162.  Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 42nd Sess., Consideration of 
reports submitted by States parties under article 18 of the Convention, ¶ 3, U.N. DOC. CEDAW/C/SR.857 
(Oct. 23, 2008) [hereinafter CEDAW/C/SR.857]. 
 163.  CEDAW/C/SR.857, supra note 162, ¶ 5. 
 164.  Diario de Sesiones, legislatura XLVI, fourth period, sesion 16, May 14, 2008; Diario de Sesiones, 
legislatura XLVI, fourth period, sesion 57, Nov. 11, 2008; Diario de Sesiones, legislatura XLVI, fifth 
period, sesion 4, Mar. 18, 2009. 
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the Chamber of Deputies165 explicitly drew on these recommendations when 
discussing a controversial bill to progressively implement gender quotas for 
government elections, which passed in 2009.166 
As a final example, the Committee again criticized Uruguay’s Civil Code and 
Code on Childhood and Adolescence, which set the minimum age for marriage 
for girls at twelve years, and recommended that the legislature raise the age to 
eighteen years.167 Senators referenced these recommendations when debating a 
bill to increase the minimum age of marriage,168 which eventually was raised to 
sixteen years. This age still fell below CEDAW’s requirement of eighteen years, 
leading the Committee to once more criticize Uruguay’s legislative 
implementation during its 2016 review.169 There is little doubt, however, that 
dialogue with the committee has raised the urgency of child marriage in the 
legislature. 
VI 
CONCLUSION 
Criticisms of the reporting and review process of the various human rights 
treaty bodies are far more common than rigorous assessments of their actual 
consequences. While there are weaknesses in the reporting system, the evidence 
presented here is a striking contrast to received wisdom on state interactions with 
expert human rights treaty bodies. This study presents evidence to suggest that 
self-reporting and dialogue between state representatives and international 
experts indeed generates new ideas, advice, and domestic pressure for change in 
practice. The periodic review process may well have been important to making 
improvements in law and in practice to guarantee full political and economic 
rights for women in many societies (indeed, on average, as the quantitative 
analysis suggests). As anyone would expect, the effect on improved women’s 
rights guarantees is not massive, but it is all the more believable for its modest 
size. 
Continued interactions are important to such improvements; modeling one-
shot effects proved useless. The number and the density of reports and reviews 
are crucial to the process of rights improvements. This is certainly far more 
realistic a finding than to expect last year’s reporting cycle to yield one-shot 
improvements in women’s political and economic rights in the following year or 
 
 165.  Diario de Sesiones, legislatura XLVI, fifth period, sesion 8, Mar. 24, 2009. 
 166.  Law No. 18476, Apr. 3, 2009, provides for the equal political participation of women and men in 
elected bodies, although it was applied only once during the 2014 national elections. 
 167.  Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 42nd Sess., Conclusions and 
recommendations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women: Uruguay, ¶¶ 
46–47, U.N. DOC. CEDAW/C/URY/CO/7 (Oct. 23, 2008). 
 168.  Diario de Sesiones, camara de senadores XLVI, fifth period, sesion 22, July 14, 2009; Diario de 
Sesiones, legislativo XLVII, fourth period, sesion 8, Apr. 2, 2013. 
 169.  Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 64th Sess., Conclusions and 
recommendations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women: Uruguay, ¶¶ 
45–46, U.N. DOC. CEDAW/C/URY/CO/8-9 (July 14, 2016). 
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so. Reporting and review histories have had a causal influence on the probability 
of improved women’s rights, in law and in practice. The effects of the CEDAW 
periodic review process are ongoing, albeit incremental, from internal report 
preparation to external dialogue to domestic engagement to preparation of the 
next report. 
This article demonstrates three mutually reinforcing pathways through which 
the self-reporting process encourages domestic actors to demand and implement 
change. Domestic shadow reports are on the rise and indicate local CSOs follow 
the process closely and provide information that supplements and sometimes 
contradicts government reports. Media reports about the CEDAW spike during 
the reporting and review process, signifying the penetration of information about 
the Geneva process to local stakeholders. And finally, legislatures pay attention 
to the review process and specific CmEDAW recommendations do have an 
impact on the lawmaking process. Taken together, the evidence points to the 
catalytic role of self-reporting and review in putting important women’s rights 
issues on national agendas, thereby creating an occasion for their national 
discussion. 
Mobilization around self-reporting does not exhaust the channels through 
which CEDAW may influence women’s rights. CEDAW may be consequential 
for its influence on a number of channels, from influencing donor’s development 
assistance policies170 to clarifying violations through the optional individual 
complaint process.171 States have quite heterogeneous experiences in their 
interactions with the CmEDAW,172 and no amount of dialogue can or should 
create homogeneous outcomes. The quality of interactions as well as the legal, 
cultural, and political context can be expected to produce quite different results 
across states. 
The evidence supporting the contribution of constructive dialogue to rights 
improvements is reasonably strong. One reason is that the review process sparks 
shadow reporting and gains a domestic audience through the national media. Far 
from finding that no one pays attention to this process outside the halls of 
Geneva, in Latin America at least the review process literally piques the 
media’s—and potentially the public’s—interest. The national media in Latin 
America, for example, is replete with discussions and debates about what 
governments are telling the experts, how shadow reports shape the conversations, 
what CmEDAW has asked, and how governments have responded. There is 
plenty of official excuse-making going on, but a surprising amount of criticism as 
well. Legislators take up these themes in official sessions. These patterns are 
consistent with a theory that treaties matter because discussing human rights 
engages interested domestic publics, who are in a better position, armed with 
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legal rights and better information, to hold their governments accountable. 
It might be useful to move away from conceptions of the treaty body report-
and-review process as an strong enforcement measure,173 and instead to think of 
the whole process as more of a dialogue, or as Zwingel puts it, “a constant process 
of negotiating and re-negotiating norms.”174 Indeed, such a reporting regime may 
be quite a cost-effective way to improve law compliance.175 At least this study 
suggests it is making a noticeable contribution at the margins in the realm of 
women’s rights. Moreover, the strength of such a reporting-and-review process 
may not be tied to a specific treaty. Whether this study’s findings also hold in 
other international settings that involve similar processes, such as Universal 
Periodic Review before the UN Human Rights Council, requires further 
research. 
Finally, the reporting regime is not a comprehensive solution to the world’s 
worst human rights abuses. Even though CEDAW ratification is now nearly 
universal, it has proved impossible to coerce a meaningful conversation out of 
unwilling states. Constructive dialogue only has effects when it actually takes 
place. That said, the results of this study suggest that the reporting and review 
system should be supported rather than disparaged. The critics who point out the 
problems of stretched resources and redundant processes have valid concerns. 
But a look at the evidence suggests that self-reporting and receiving 
recommendations has an important causal role to play in starting conversations 
that reverberate domestically and open up possibilities for change. 
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